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EGOS Montreal 2013 - Call for "Organizational Trust"

  • 1.  EGOS Montreal 2013 - Call for "Organizational Trust"

    Posted 11-16-2012 05:27

    Dear All

    We would like to direct your attention to our call for EGOS 2013 in Montreal "Authority, Prices and Trust: Within and Across Boundaries" - a call of the standard working group on "organizational trust". With this call we try to bridge OMT and BPS research on trust with OB research on trust. More specifically we seek theoretical or empirical research that explores the role of the organizational context (or of interorganizational governance structures) to organizational trust. We are interested in research that looks at the influence of rules, bureaucracy, control mechanisms, reward and incentives, power relations etc. on trust in the organization or at the joint effects of structural aspects and trust on performance (eg. whether trust and control are substitutes or complements). The call is therefore quite broad - if you are not sure whether your paper idea fits the topic - please do not hesitate to contact Thomas Mellewigt beforehand.

    If you are interested you need to apply with a short paper:

    Deadline: January 14
    Submission guidelines for short papers: http://www.egosnet.org/swgs/current_swgs

    Best regards

    Thomas Mellewigt

    Please read the full call here:

    Authority, Prices and Trust: Within and Across Organizational Boundaries

    Antoinette Weibel, University of Konstanz

    Reinhard Bachmann, University of Surrey

    Thomas Mellewigt, Freie Universität Berlin

     

    More than twenty years ago, Bradach and Eccles (1989) suggested analyzing control and coordination in and between organizations as complex phenomena where three different mechanisms are intertwined: authority, prices and trust.

    Authority provides the power to hold people accountable for their actions and to influence directly what they do and how they do it. Prices, for example, in the form of performancecontingent rewards or as transferprices, are a powerful instrument to form expectations of exchange partners because they orient the exchange partners' behaviour towards predetermined objectives. Finally, trust is based on positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another actor in a situation where the actions of this other party are neither completely determined by fiat nor clearly aligned by incentives (Rousseau et al.1998; Zand, 1972).

    While our understanding of authority, prices and trust has grown tremendously we still have not adequately tackled the call of Bradach and Eccles (1989) to analyze the interplay of these mechanisms. For example, in trust research a vivid debate has developed on whether trust and authority (in the form of formal control) are positively or negatively related (Bachmann, 2001; Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Weibel, 2007). Yet, we still do not know enough about why trust and authority sometimes act as substitutes and sometimes as complements. Even less developed are discussions on how authority (in the form of power) and trust are related or how trust and prices may be inter-linked.

    Against this background, the aim of this track is to encourage and inspire discussions on the combination of authority, prices and trust in and between organizations. We seek contributions that analyze the interaction effects among these mechanisms, disentangle conditions under which these combinations have positive rather than negative effects and help to understand why such relationships and dynamics evolve. Examples of relevant questions to be addressed by this sub-theme include the following:

    1.     How are formal control and trust in the organization (or between organizations) related?

    2.     Which types of control and which control configurations are conducive to building trust in the organization (or between organizations)?

    3.     Can and, if so, in what way can formal controls repair trust in organizations?

    4.     What is the impact of regulations (standards, controls) at the individual level: do they make behaviour more  trustworthy?

    5.     What are the effects of price formation on trust between exchange partners? Which type of price formation encourages or inhibits the development of trust within and across organizational boundaries?

    6.     What is the effect of performance-contingent rewards on trust? How does this type of reward enable or undermine cooperative trust-based relationships ( between team members, teams or larger organizational units)?

    7.     In what ways can a façade of trust mask the deliberate use of power? And how are trust and power related in empowerment initiatives?

    8.     etc.

     

    References

     

    Bachmann, R. (2001). Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations. Organization Studies, 22(2), 337-365.
    Bradach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms. Annual Sociological Review, 15, 97-118.
    Mellewigt, T., Madhok, A., & Weibel, A. (2007). Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships  -  substitutes and complements. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(8), 833-847.
    Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. F. (1998). Introduction to Special Topic Forum: Not so Different After all: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393-404.
    Weibel, A. (2007). Formal control and trustworthiness - never the twain shall meet? Group & Organization Management, 32(4), 500-517.
    Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Adminstrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 229-239.
     


    Prof. Dr. Thomas Mellewigt
    Freie Universität Berlin
    Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Institut für Management
    (School of Business & Economics, Dept of Management)
    Garystraße 21
    D-14195 Berlin (Germany)
    Tel.: +49 30 838 52845
    Fax: +49 30 838 52783
    E-Mail: thomas.mellewigt@fu-berlin.de
    Web: http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/institute/management/mellewigt/index.html